ASTM
I am a dues paying member of ASTM International. ASTM used to stand for the American Society for Testing and Measurement, an organization that set industry standards for things like the required density of concrete used in highway bridges or the varying characteristics of plastic. It doesn’t sound like the usual political, educational or athletic group I involve myself with. But they also make recommendations about the size of pole vault mats, and all the other safety equipment required. That’s right up my alley. So I’m on ASTM, Committee F08 (Sports Equipment), Sub Committee 67 on pole vault.
And that’s why I get the monthly “Standards” magazine, which usually doesn’t get too far into the house. But this month, one of the “standards” discussed how to protect schools, and that’s an area where I used to have a significant amount of professional concern. So I read it.
Tempered Glass
There was a lot of talk about tempered glass, not completely bullet-proof glass, but bullet resistant to make it more difficult for a school shooter to gain access to the building. The glass is tempered with coatings that prevented it from shattering, instead just leaving bullet holes from the testing device (an AR-15). The shooter would then have to bust in the rest with his gun, or kick it out with his foot. It wouldn’t stop him, but buys additional time. That gives schools more opportunity to react. This standard was for school shootings like Sandy Hook in Connecticut and the Covenant School in Nashville.
The article also went into detail about “bollards”, the concrete posts designed to stop a careening vehicle from crashing into the school or a car bomb from parking too close. It explained how the “bollards” could be reinforced by brick walls or weakened by placement uphill from the “target” building. That’s more of a reaction to terror attacks throughout the world, but still applies to the ultimate soft target, a school.
The Cavalry
It discussed the use of metal detectors, (three kinds, hand attached, hand held, or standing arches). Wisely, it spoke of placing metal detection in some area of the school that could be locked away from the main part of the building, should a weapon be discovered. If metal detection is in the main hall, the “gun” is already in the building. That’s why newer buildings are built with a two-stage entryway.
And the article also mentioned video cameras, and pointed out the obvious. Cameras don’t stop anything. While they serve to alert staff what’s going on, in general, cameras are more for evidence after the fact rather than alerting and averting the event all-together. There is the one exception: the roving shooter, like the Marjorie Stoneman Douglas shootings in Florida. Building cameras can be used by staff and law enforcement to target the “cavalry” for the rescue.
Proactive
And I guess that’s the whole point. Schools “standards”, like the Secret Service with their protectees, are mostly “reactive”. Sure, the Secret Service will “take a bullet” for their protectees, but the real point is to stop that first bullet from being fired. Apalachee High School in Georgia did a wonderful job of getting School Resource Officers to the shooter. The two police officers risked their lives to protect staff and students from further attack. But there were already four dead, and nine wounded. Certainly lives were saved. But it was reactive, not proactive.
The Secret Service has a vast population to look to, and folks of every political persuasion to worry about. They require a huge network of intelligence to stay ahead of possible violence. But schools have a much narrower “pool” of candidates. Sure, there’s a possible random stranger, but evidence shows that most school shooters are either current or former students. Schools know them, which creates an opportunity for intervention before the worst case occurs. The school just needs to know to intervene.
Apalachee
The Apalachee High shooter’s mother called the school about thirty minutes before the attack. She said her child was “in crisis” and needed immediate contact. Did she tell the school that the crisis involved in AR-15? Not to my knowledge. But the school counselors and administration did their best to reach him. That all takes time; from the counselor to an administrator, to look up the schedule, and to physically get to the student.
And, as any parent picking up their kid from high school can tell you; just because he’s scheduled in room 410 at 10:00am, doesn’t mean he’s in Room 410 at 10:00am. There’s all sorts of legitimate reasons for a kid to be out of class: restroom, band room, library, office, guidance, tutoring, nurse. Sure the teacher in Room 410 should and probably does know where he is, but that just means more time. The clock is ticking. At Apalachee they didn’t reach him in time to stop the carnage.
Lessons
There are lots of things the 1999 Columbine school shootings taught us. Now, teachers hide students out of the shooter’s sight, barricade doors and prepare to defend them if breeched. If there’s a clear line of escape out of the building – go!! But the biggest lesson of Columbine was this: the shooters were plotting their attack for months. Like the 9-11 attacks, there were plenty of people who knew pieces of what they were plotting. But there was no one who could put the pieces together.
And that’s on the school. Administrators, Guidance, Teachers, Staff (nurses, cooks, custodians, bus drivers, SRO’s, and the folks who know EVERYTHING – secretaries) and students need to communicate about kids that might be at risk. It’s not usually the “bad” kids; everyone knows them. It’s the kid that few know. When I first went into education they were called the “Cipher in the Snow” kids. (Cipher in the Snow was a short-film put out by Brigham Young University back in 1974 about a kid who dies and no one knows him).
Web of Concern
Kids need to find some adult they can talk to. Adults need to find kids they can relate with. Adults have to talk to other adults, and kids to kids. There has to be a web of communication, so that if someone is going wrong, other folks know and action (pro-action) can be taken. It’s that web of protection that doesn’t have an ASTM “standard”, but it is the best defense against school violence.
A school can put up tempered glass. They can structure a “safe” building, and practice “active shooter drills”. There can be advanced plans for “evasion” and “rendezvous”. They can surround the entrances with bollards. All of those are reactions, and they are all absolutely necessary. Any school without those plans is committing “malpractice”.
But, the only proactive method to try to evert school shootings is creating lines of communication between kids and adults; parents and staff. Those lines can forewarn against a student going “over the edge”. It’s a “web” of communication and support. And that needs to be a defined “plan”, just as much as the plan to lock the door and hide in the farthest corner. A parent calls about their kid; or a kid comes off the bus with word that a friend is in crisis; that must become the most important thing. It’s priority “one”, even in these days when there are always lots of very important priorities. The “web” of concern is the best chance to avoid the unimaginable.
