All Options on the Table

All Options On the Table

In the weeds about North Korea

It’s not that the controversy which surrounds the Trump Administration isn’t important: on this day after General Kelly became Chief of Staff, the “Mooch” left the building, and the word leaked out that the President wrote the Donald Jr. statement which lied about “the meeting,” it’s hard to focus beyond it. But the world keeps turning regardless of the US political turmoil, and the void created by America’s internal focus becomes more apparent.

The Trump Administration argues that it can do more than one thing at a time. Let’s hope so.

North Korea tested it’s most advanced Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) last week, and data shows that it has a range that includes Chicago, Columbus, and perhaps even the east coast (a side note: as a resident of the Midwest, the news broadcaster’s pronouncements that “even the east coast might be in range” is little comfort when my home is clearly within the cone of destruction.) While there are several caveats: the North Koreans don’t have a small enough warhead to fit on the missile yet, we aren’t sure of their targeting abilities, and there are questions about the missile surviving re-entry; all of those problems are relatively easy to solve.

The United States stands by its long held view that North Korea will NOT be allowed to have a nuclear tipped ICBM that can reach the US. As that point draws near (estimates show that the complete missile package may be done as soon as six months from now) the US is faced with a nuclear crisis. It is the classic dilemma. Do you pre-emptively strike an opponent prior to their developing a nuclear weapon, launching a non-nuclear first strike and triggering a conventional war? Or, do you wait until the nuclear weapon is developed, and then use a threat of nuclear retaliation to prevent the weapon’s use? Or do you use non-military threats, sanctions, boycotts and pressures to either hinder the weapon’s development or use?

Pre-emptive strike is a tempting strategy, as it is the only one that takes a nuclear strike on the United States completely off of the board. They can’t strike the US without the capability of doing so. However, there are several problems with this.

First, a US pre-emptive strike would inevitably trigger a North Korean response against both US troops (30,000 in South Korea alone, with another 39,000 nearby in Japan) and South Korea. [1] Such an attack would be devastating, as 12 million South Koreans are within range of North Korean artillery (30 miles) arrayed just beyond the demilitarized zone.[2] Assuming other countries don’t join with North Korean (China, Russia, others) the outcome of the next Korean War would inevitably favor the United States, but the losses in such a war (in all probability much greater than the 1.2 million Koreans and 36,000 Americans killed or missing in the first Korean War[3]) would make this a conflict the United States should be unwilling to start.

Second, a pre-emptive strike is based on the assumption that the North Koreans have not yet developed combat ready nuclear weapons, or that we could neutralize those weapons prior to use. A nuclear artillery shell, fired from North Korea into the South Korean capital Seoul would have millions of casualties, and would likely happen immediately at the onset of war.

Put simply, a pre-emptive strike on North Korea would start a major war, greater in scope than any conflict since World War II. It would likely result in the destruction of North Korea, and also the destruction of South Korea, and parts of Japan as well.

Mutual Assured Destruction is the theory that got the world through the Cold War Era. The nuclear powers, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, had the indestructible ability to destroy each other with a “second strike,” regardless of who attacked first, and therefore were able to step back from using the ultimate weapons.

This theory could apply to North Korea, even though they would not have the indestructible ability to destroy the US.  They could potentially hit the US with a nuclear strike.  This second approach to the North Korean problem would presume (always dangerous) that North Korea is unwilling to face nuclear destruction, and therefore would not use nuclear weapons in a “first strike.”

In addition, the US military has developed both the THADD missile defense system (short and intermediate ballistic missiles) and the GMD (ground based mid-course defense for ICBM’s) to interdict North Korean attacks. While both have been tested successfully, no missile defense system is 100% effective: a missile could get through, with devastating nuclear consequences[4].

The problem with this strategy is that it also depends the “unwillingness” of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, to risk nuclear annihilation. And while logic would be on the side of staying alive, one only has to look to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, who went to war, lost, was deposed and finally executed; all to protect the weapons of mass destruction that he didn’t have rather than admit he didn’t have them.

The third strategy would be that the United States should do what it could using economic and international pressure to try to keep North Korea in check, while planning for an eventuality of North Korean nuclear weaponry. This plan would be perhaps similar to the Iran Nuclear Agreement, which does not prevent their nuclear development, but does delay it for several years, with the final outcome to be determined.

In order get international and economic pressure, the United States will need to build a coalition of nations, just as the Obama Administration did with the Iran deal. For the US to “go it alone” with North Korea not only takes everyone else off the hook, allowing US policy to be hamstrung by North Korean actions, but it also guarantees a more dangerous position. The US is “poking the bear” of North Korea, flying B-1 Bomber missions nearby and threatening to keep “all options on the table.” We should be gathering other nations, including China and even Russia, to put real pressure on Kim.

While it seems reasonable and intuitive to say that North Korea should not be allowed to get nuclear weapons that can reach the United States, the costs associated with truly preventing this outcome are not acceptable. Given that, it will be a mixture of Mutual Assured Destruction and international pressure that must be American policy. Let’s hope the generals of the Trump Administration stop waving our weapons, and start building a coalition.

 

 

[1] http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-japan-north-korea-asia-590278

[2] http://articles.latimes.com/2003/may/27/world/fg-norkor27

[3] http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/28/world/asia/korean-war-fast-facts/index.html

[4] http://abcnews.go.com/US/us-defense-capabilities-handle-threat-north-korean-missile/story?id=48433772